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Institutional Economics of the “Market Itself”. 
An Attempted Answer to a Complaint 
 by Ronald Coase 
Rudolf Richter  
Abstract: »Eine Institutionenökonomie des “Marktes selbst”: Der Versuch 
einer Antwort auf eine Kritik Ronald Coases«. This paper is motivated by the 
remark of Coase that “although economists claim to study the working of the 
market, in modern economic theory the market itself has an even more shad-
owy role than the firm.” It is argued that under conditions of positive transac-
tion costs, incomplete foresight and bounded rationality – the conditions of the 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) – the institutional framework not only of 
firms but also of markets matters. Actors who plan to buy or sell a good under 
conditions of NIE are facing two institutional choice problems: First, to choose 
or establish a specific market system within which to trade the good and, sec-
ond, to choose a specific exchange contract. Both are nonmarket coordination 
problems – the first is a problem of collective action between a multiplicity of 
suppliers and demanders; the second is a problem of bilateral action: the coor-
dination of individual plans between two parties. Only the first problem is ob-
ject of this paper. Our hypothesis is that the organization of markets is a collec-
tive good, which may be a product of laissez faire or of planned collective 
action. So far there exists no systematic theory of the NIE of markets, only a 
number of considerations on specific issues concerning the basic functions of 
trade, viz., the activities of search, inspection, bargaining, contract execution, 
control, and enforcement. We content ourselves to describe and comment on 
some prominent examples from the NIE literature and related approaches to 
illustrate the kind of considerations that are part of an evolving new institu-
tional economic theory of “the market itself” and argue that, for reasons of the 
general interest of traders themselves, some forms of planned collective actions 
are unavoidable. 
Keywords: transaction costs, new institutional economics, theory of markets, 
organization of markets. 
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1. Introductory Remarks 
This paper is motivated by the remark of Coase (1988, 7) that “although 
economists claim to study the working of the market, in modern economic 
theory the market itself has an even more shadowy role than the firm.” It seems 
natural to reflect on Coase’s complaint by extending Coase’s (1937) argument 
for the nature of the firm by postulating positive transaction costs also for the 
nature of the market (as an institution or organization). Let us use the concept 
of transaction costs in the wider sense of “the costs of running the economic 
system” (Arrow 1969, 48) that include besides the costs of using the market the 
costs of using, maintaining, changing etc. of institutions or organizations in 
general. In addition let us assume they include also the costs of the conse-
quences of imperfect foresight (like the costs of planning mistakes, backup 
arrangements, reorganization etc.) and boundedly rational decision-making 
(like the costs of gathering and processing information).  
Now, in the neoclassical world of costless transactions, perfect foresight and 
perfect rationality there is no need for a specific market system. It does not 
matter whether an individual trades only occasionally or professionally, 
whether he goes to the next street corner or sets up a whole network of trade 
relationships. This is the world of general equilibrium theory2 in which every-
body is trading with everybody else on whatever goods (he wishes) for all 
times to come. However, the model is institutionally neutral, i.e., the institu-
tional framework is irrelevant if only the optimality conditions of general equi-
librium theory are satisfied. Thus, it would apply equally to a socialist as to a 
capitalist economy3 or to “hierarchies and markets”. In other words, we cannot 
differentiate between various institutional arrangements. Institutions don’t 
matter; their productive results are the same as long as the optimality condi-
tions of general equilibrium theory are satisfied.  
By contrast, Coase (1937) argued that the assumption of positive transaction 
costs is critical for discriminating between different institutions, in his case, 
between the firm and the market. Under certain circumstances the institution 
“firm” is preferred to that of the “market” because “certain marketing costs are 
saved” (Coase 1937, 392).4 However, the same argument can be used to ex-
                                                             
2  Partial equilibrium theory is an artifact of it. 
3  “The optimality conditions [of general equilibrium theory], being simply technical require-
ments, contain no ideological implications. They apply equally to capitalism, socialism, or 
any other “ism.” Whatever the political ideology of a country, it could make all of its citi-
zens better off by ensuring that production and allocation satisfied the optimality condi-
tions. (Lancaster 1969, 276) See also Furubotn and Richter (2005, Section 1.2). 
4  Coase continues: “The entrepreneur has to carry out his function at less cost, taking into 
account the fact that he may get factors of production at a lower price than the market 
transactions which he supersedes, because it is always possible to revert to the open market 
if he fails to do this.” (ibid.) 
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plain the existence of the enormously large number of different specific mar-
kets such as the London Stock Exchange, eBay, weekly town markets, annual 
fairs, real estate markets, producers’ markets like the US automobile market, 
etc.. Their organization (market order or system) can be conceived as a collec-
tive good whose aim is to economize on the costs of transactions, incomplete 
foresight and bounded rationality. Their specific norms may be understood as 
being built on the elementary constitutional rules of the liberal state regarding 
private property, contractual obligations and obligations from tortuous acts that 
are guaranteed by a supreme authority: the state.5 Some specific market sys-
tems evolve spontaneously such as those of the black market for US cigarettes 
in Frankfurt (Main), Germany, after World War II, the “Polish Market” in 
Berlin after the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, etc.6 Yet most specific 
markets are generated by identifiable people – such as the members of a city 
council or the producers of new products – even though they contain (or may 
contain) spontaneous elements.7  
In every case, in the world of positive transaction costs, actors who plan to 
buy or sell a specific (type of) good face two (interrelated) problems of institu-
tional choice: First, to choose or establish a specific market organization8 
[market system] within which to trade the good – such as a stock exchange, a 
weekly market, a producers’ market, an online market, etc. and, second, to 
choose within that market organization [system] a specific exchange contract 
(a contractual governance structure9) with their trading partner. Both are non-
market coordination problems – the first is a problem of collective action be-
tween a multiplicity of suppliers and demanders; the second is a problem of 
bilateral action between two parties: a supplier and a demander. Both aim at an 
institution or organization that economizes on the costs of transactions, incom-
plete foresight and bounded rationality. The Coasian question, which we set out 
to deal with, relates to the first problem: the establishment or choice of a spe-
cific market [system] on which traders wish to do business.10 The second prob-
                                                             
5  A simplification, cf. North (1990, 58). 
6  On the rise of open-air markets all over Eastern Europe in the 1990s see Sik and Wallace 
(1999); Karazman-Morawetz and Pilgram (1993) (quoted from Egbert 2007). 
7  “Spontaneous” and “made” order in the sense of Hayek (1973) Law, Legislation and Liber-
ty, Vol. I, Rules and Order, Ch. 2). “Spontaneous” or “made” – they “[…] share the com-
mon characteristics of the need for collective action and the allocation of resources through 
nonmarket methods.” (Arrow 1974, 26) 
8  Or market “order” (Hayek 1973, 40ff.). 
9  Williamson (1985, 32): “Organize transactions so as to economize on bounded rationality 
while simultaneously safeguarding the against the hazards of opportunism.” – Since large 
numbers of contracts are incomplete, the parties to a contract must agree, either explicitly or 
tacitly, “about the procedure [the ‘constitution’] that will be employed to deal with prob-
lems that may arise in the future” (Macneil 1974, 753). 
10  A private collective good would be a club good in the case of a closed market, or a private 
public good in case of an open market – similar to Coase’s (1974) lighthouse example. 
 37
lem, the choice of the transaction cost economizing governance structure of 
exchange contracts, is the problem of Williamson’s transaction cost economics. 
We argue that the organization of a specific market system is a collective good. 
It is either the result of spontaneous action (controlled by an “invisible hand” 
mechanism) or its order is “made” by human design11 (by a “visible hand” 
mechanism). For both views exist institutional economic approaches: The 
spontaneously evolved order [system] is object of the “institutions-as-an-
equilibrium-of-a-game” approach;12 the “made” order is object of Olson’s 
(1965) “logic collective action”.13 We’ll keep these two approaches in mind and 
resort to them as needed. 
Though, Coase compares only two general types of institutional arrange-
ments, markets and firms, he could have gone on to compare with each other 
various specific types (organizational templates) of firms or markets or hybrid 
forms between markets and firms. In the NIE world, Coase’s reasons for the 
nature of the firm could be extended to the nature of the different specific or-
ganizational templates of an economy, markets and firms (or mixtures thereof), 
that can be seen as different ways of economizing on transaction costs - inclu-
sive the costs of incomplete foresight and bounded rationality.14  
2. On Elements of Market Systems 
The organization of “perfect markets” is fully described by the abstract ele-
mentary constitutional norms of private property, contractual obligations and 
liabilities from tort – given zero transaction costs, perfect foresight and perfect 
individual rationality.15 In the more realistic world of the NIE, however, market 
systems (or organizations) need to include also more concrete elements, among 
                                                             
11  Hayek (1973). 
12  According to which an institution is defined as a salient Nash equilibrium of a recurrent 
“supergame” about the way a given “underlying game” (e.g., a prisoner’s dilemma game) is 
repeatedly played (see Furubotn and Richter 2005, 8). 
13  That answers the free rider problem, the problem who pays for the set up and administration 
of a “made” organization (Olson 1965, 9f.). 
14  To understand correctly: Different from neoclassical microeconomics, we think in a non-
optimizing sense. Reason is that it makes not much sense to add up transaction costs proper, 
costs of adaptation and costs of bounded rationality like production costs. Instead we are 
following Demsetz’s (1969) comparative institution approach, i.e., we stop thinking in con-
straint optimization processes and assume that actors compare with each other concrete pat-
terns of market organizations by taking into account economizing aspects, if only in some 
rough comparative manner. (See, e.g., Furubotn and Richter 2005, 108-110). 
15  The proper design of “market order,” i.e., the order of perfect markets, is the central issue 
of German Ordnungspolitik as advocated by Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, Wilhelm Röpke, 
Alexander Rüstow and the “Austrian” economist Friedrich August von Hayek; see 
Schmidtchen (1984) or Richter (2011). 
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them, aids of trade such as common timing,16 common units of measurement,17 
common locations of trade (local markets,18 an internet platform), common 
usage of money, the legal construct of “liquidity,”19 the organization of price 
formation (auctioning, rigid prices cum advertising, wage bargaining between 
unions and employers associations) – and all this interlinked by a network of 
social ties between traders and the rest of the economy. The reason ist that 
markets do not function in a social vacuum.20  
However, the centuries old debate on the nature and evolution of money il-
lustrates the scientific and political difficulties that such aids of trade (and trust 
into them) can raise.21  
Interestingly, the assumed use of money in markets (which presupposes fric-
tions = transaction costs) did not induce economists to call such markets “im-
perfect markets”. For the same reason, financial markets are seen as a natural 
part of perfect markets (= efficient markets) though they make only sense if – 
due to imperfect foresight – pure futures markets “fail” (Hicks 1946). To 
adapt freely Goethe: Two souls alas! are dwelling in the neoclassical econo-
mist’s breast. 
As for location issues only transportation costs, not the more general concept 
of transaction costs, have been considered and gave rise to a special branch of 
neoclassical economics: location theory.22 
Location theory is neglected by new institutional economists in spite of the 
fact that, up to date, transportation costs make up a non-negligible part of the 
costs of using the market (“transaction costs”). The problem is that the trans-
portation problem lends itself to standard “quantitative” analysis (optimization 
under constraints), while institutional economics requires very different, 
“qualitative” methods of optimization. Still, location problems are a central is-
sue of market organization and should not be disregarded completely by insti-
tutional economists.  
Regarding the role of social relationships, one sociological textbook example 
comes from Abolafia (1984) who showed that even in security exchanges – the 
classic example of perfect markets – social structure (informal organization) 
matters; it helps improving the market mechanism. “Fiercely independent eco-
                                                             
16  The calendar introduced by Pope Gregor XIII in 1582 that was only slowly accepted by all 
trading nation states; the introduction of international time zones based on Greenwich Time 
was suggested by an international congress 1889. It took a couple of decennia until it was 
accepted globally. 
17  The extension of local markets required an extension of the range of validity of units of 
measurement and weight. The metric system has been introduced in the 19th century and is 
by now almost globally applied. The only exceptions among large states are England and 
USA. Germany introduced the metric system in 1868. 
18  Local markets are extended to large area markets (“nationwide” or “global” markets). 
19  The ability to fulfill one’s payment obligations. (Stützel 1959, 625). 
20  Hamilton and Feenstra (1995, 61). 
21  On the history of monetary economics see Dimand (2008). 
22  More or less started by Thünen (1826).  
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nomic actors are, at the same time, reliant on one another.” (Abolafia 1984, 
132) 
Anyway, there exists no systematic theory of the NIE of markets, only a 
number of considerations on specific issues concerning the institutional eco-
nomics of the basic functions of trade, i.e., the activities of search, inspection, 
bargaining, contract execution, control, and enforcement. We content ourselves 
to describe and comment on some prominent examples from the NIE literature 
and related approaches to illustrate the kind of considerations that are at least 
part of an evolving new institutional economic theory of markets. (The exam-
ples from the NIE literature and more are reprinted in Furubotn and Richter 
2010). 
For clarity we are reducing above six elementary transaction activities into 
three categories:  
1) Precontractual activities (search and inspection) 
2) Contracting (contract formation)  
3) Postcontractual activities (execution, control and enforcement).  
After a compressed report and comments on some of the institutional economic 
answers on above issues and their assessment we shall indicate some possible 
steps towards a more systematic presentation of the characteristics of the NIE 
of markets.23 
3. Precontractual Activities: Search and Inspection 
A typical “classical” answer to the problem of search and inspection would be 
to do what textbooks do,24 namely, to allow only for spot trade and let buyers 
and sellers meet at the same time and same place, such as on weekly markets. 
But even then information about product prices and product quality25 will be a 
problem under NIE conditions. As for product quality, Nelson (1970) points 
out that information about it can be achieved either by way of search or through 
experience. “Experience will be used when search becomes too expensive” 
(318). Nelson correspondingly distinguishes between “search goods” and “ex-
perience goods”. Typical search goods are, according to his classification, 
cameras, furniture, china, glassware. Typical experience goods are soft drinks, 
television sets, automobiles, and bicycles. Advertising as a vehicle for informa-
                                                             
23  The referred to literature and more is reprinted in a collective volume compiled and edited 
by Furubotn and Richter (2010). 
24  Cf. Stackelberg (1948, 219ff.). 
25  Nelson assumes that consumers already know where they can obtain each of the options 
open to them. Their information problem is to evaluate the utility of each option. He defines 
search to include any way of evaluating these options subject to two restrictions: (1) the 
consumer must inspect the option, and (2) the inspection must occur prior to purchasing the 
brand (1970, 312). 
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tion plays a role in the case of search goods, but personal inspection is also 
important. Misleading advertising results in costs to the advertiser, for “he 
suffers a decline in his credibility for future advertisements and pays the costs 
of processing non-buying customers” (Nelson 1974, 730). Therefore, “consum-
ers can have some confidence that the advertising of search qualities bears a 
close relation to the truth” (730). This is much less so in case of experience 
goods: “The major control that consumers have over the market for experience 
qualities is whether they repeat the purchase of a brand or not” (730). There-
fore, consumers cannot expect much direct information from advertising con-
cerning experience qualities. What they get is important indirect information: 
“The consumer can learn that the brand advertises.” Nelson contents that this 
is the useful information. Advertisements for experience goods need not have 
informational content. Their total informational role [...] is simply contained in 
their existence” (732). It is advertisement for experience goods that is of par-
ticular interest to neoinstitutionalists as a means to save on transaction costs.  
A general answer to Nelson’s problem is to view advertising expenditures 
(sunk cost) as hostages in the hands of ones customers. The analytical back-
ground for that view is provided by the theory of self-enforcing contracts, 
which we’ll return to further below. 
A different way to cut search cost is to use personal ties as done by Grano-
vetter (1974/1995) for cases of job search. According to his sample, personal 
contact is the predominant method of finding out about jobs. Thus, the relevant 
factors of finding a job turn out to be social. Job finding behavior is “[…] heav-
ily embedded in other social processes that closely constrain and determine its 
course and results” (1995, 39). Of those people finding a job through contacts, 
the majority saw their contact only occasionally or rarely, i.e., was only weakly 
tied with their contacts. Granovetter is certainly no new institutional economist 
(in fact he is opposing it – or at least Williamson’s TCA). But his study fits 
well into the style of neoinstitutional research. Granovetter himself concedes 
that many of his findings are easily explained in terms of rational behavior 
(1974/1995, 96). The reason would be that information is costly (loc. cit. 99). 
But also the quality of information would explain why employers and em-
ployees prefer to or make use of personal contacts in securing labor market 
information. 
The point underlined by Granovetter’s study is that markets do not function 
in a social vacuum (Hamilton and Feenstra 1995, 61). Personal contacts, coop-
eration, social ties between potential buyers and sellers (including hierarchical 
relationships and relationships arising from organized groups) all play roles. 
Analytically this aspect is based on network analysis. Actors are, as Granovet-
ter puts it, “embedded” in a network of social relations. They “[…] are so con-
strained by ongoing socials relations that to construe them as independent is a 
grievous misunderstanding.” (Granovetter 1985/1995, 212).  
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These arguments were put forward not only by Granovetter but also by other 
sociologists among them Coleman (1984), Burt (1983), Abolafia (1984).  
Barzel (1982) concentrates much of his work on the problems and costs of 
inspection (he calls it “measurement”). To eliminate errors in measurement 
completely would be too costly. The value of equally priced items on weekly 
markets, e.g., will differ, and people will spend resources to acquire the differ-
ence. Such resource expenditure would be wasteful, and Barzel hypothesizes 
that traders therefore implicitly agree on methods that help to reduce this kind 
of resource use. The customer’s random selection from an already optimally 
sorted commodity will avoid the excessive expense. A mutual agreement 
among traders is to be expected that some readily obtainable information will 
be suppressed to preempt opportunities for excessive measurement (Barzel 
1982, 48).  
Analytically, Barzel’s measurement problem results from the existence of 
asymmetric information between buyer and seller – with the seller being in 
general the better-informed party (Spence 1974). While sellers of low quality 
products (“lemons”) might be tempted to mislead their customers, sellers of 
high quality products will undertake efforts to “signal” their quality. For a 
signal to be effective (credible), it must be unprofitable for sellers of low qual-
ity products to imitate it (Spence 1976, 592). Thus, e.g., “To offer a warranty is 
a costly activity for the seller of lemons, but not very costly for the seller of 
good cars. Hence, this signal allows the buyers to discriminate between the two 
types of cars” (Varian 1992, 469). Provided it is sufficiently costly, the seller of 
the high quality product can afford to apply the signal “warrantee,” while the 
seller of low quality products cannot. Similarly, investment in brand-name 
capital through, for example, high advertising expenditures can be seen as 
credible signals. 
Kenney and Klein (1983) describe the somewhat peculiar selling policy of 
the Central Selling Organization (CSO) of the De Beers Group26 as a practical 
device to avoid oversearching. They suggest that its selling practice contributes 
to a reduction of search cost by minimizing buyers’ oversearching for informa-
tion. Stones are sorted according to shape, quality, colour, and weight in more 
than two thousand categories. Still, the variants in the value of stones within 
each category are substantial. To avoid oversearching, stones of each category 
are sorted by De Beers into imperfectly homogeneous categories and sold in 
preselected blocks to preselected buyers at non-negotiable prices. In this case 
the agreement among marketers is somewhat forced by the (once) monopolistic 
seller: If buyers’ rejected the sales offer they were no more invited by De Beers 
to purchase stones. However, this policy has (or had) also its advantages to 
buyers, who, since they have a long-term business relationship with De Beers, 
                                                             
26  That markets most of the world’s gem-quality uncut diamonds. 
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are earning rents the present value of which is greater than they would earn if 
they rejected sights of lower than average quality. “Since these rents are lost if 
the buyer decides to reject a sight and is terminated from the list of invited 
buyers, a wealth-maximizing buyer will not generally reject sights […]” 
(Kenney and Klein 1983, 506).  
Important is to remember that above described practical solutions of the 
problems of search and inspection are a matter of an implicitly agreed upon 
market order (market organization, market system), i.e., they are a problem of 
collective action. In most of above examples it may be seen as result of an 
invisible hand process. The usual argument is that market system tends towards 
a transaction cost economizing state. The special problems (and costs) of in-
complete foresight and bounded rationality are rarely mentioned (for an excep-
tion see Williamson27). They play a vital role on asset markets where the ex-
pected resale value of the traded products is essential – as illustrated by the 
financial crisis of 2008. In this case, Akerlof’s (1970) lemons principle is strik-
ingly important – much more so than on his used car market example. The 
buyer of a financial asset (such as a subprime mortgage security) must worry 
about the quality of what he buys.  
If he suspects that the security is being offered because the seller knows that 
the security has a problem, he will not be willing to buy it unless he is given a 
large discount. Because the potential sellers’ reactions to the discounts depress 
quality even more, trading volume can be reduced to a bare minimum; as in 
the used-car market, there may even be a complete market breakdown. (Hell-
wig 2008, 9) 
Avoidance of a breakdown of financial markets demands the supply of a col-
lective good, viz., a market system that includes some type of quality control or 
regulation. Opportunistic misrepresentations or supposedly cost saving sup-
pression of information on the quality of the traded product becomes a prob-
lem. There are reasons to doubt the regulative ability of an invisible hand 
mechanism and demand a ‘made’ market system (or market organization) in 
which case Olson’s (1965) logic of collective actions applies. The organiza-
tional answers include anything between establishing of a private organization 
(like a security exchange) and passing of special laws by the state.  
Different from – say – diamonds, money claims require continuous monitor-
ing. In case of bank loans, the financial intermediary combines origination, 
underwriting, funding, and servicing of the loan – and it is liable towards in-
vestors. As a consequence, the bank has an incentive to monitor the loan – a 
costly activity. With securitization, however, origination and funding are sepa-
rated, which weakens the originator’s incentive to monitor the securitized 
portfolio. Moral hazard becomes a problem, and is enhanced by the formation 
                                                             
27  He mentions “[…] the ex post costs of maladaptation and adjustment that arise when con-
tract execution is misaligned as a result of gaps, errors, omissions, and unanticipated distur-
bances” (Williamson 1996, 379). 
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of CDOs. Different from, the diamond market, suppression of information on 
financial markets entails the incentive to originate and sell low quality claims 
that may (and in fact did) end up as lemons or “toxic assets”. 
4. Contracting: Agreeing on Prices and Further Stipulations 
We shall discuss two NIE problems in this section: the problems of the forma-
tion of prices (a central issue of price theory) and of contractual stipulations (an 
issue of contract theory).  
The mantra of neoclassical price theory is that demand and supply deter-
mine the price as graphically described by the Marshallian Cross.28 Vernon 
Smith (1962) corroborated it with his experimental study of competitive market 
behavior. His experiment and the praxis of auctions show that neoclassical 
style price formation demands the strict observation of a clearly defined set of 
market rules. To organize a complete market economy in this style would not 
only be a very costly affair, it would also demand a bureaucracy that hampered 
the economy’s adaptability to unforeseen events29 (inclusive unforeseen ideas 
and technical developments). De facto, most prices are announced by one side 
(usually the producers or sellers) and then kept constant for a while. As a con-
sequence, prices are comparatively rigid, a phenomenon that characterizes all 
advanced economies.30 One transaction cost reason is the “menu costs” (the 
costs of changing price labels). Their size is not negligible as shown, i.a., by 
Levy, Bergen, Dutta, Venable (1997). Other reasons are based on the worry of 
price wars and irritations of customers (Blinder et al. 1998, 85), or, differently 
expressed, on the common desire to cultivate the price setters’ business rela-
tionships with their competitors and customers.  
Empirical work on rigid prices exploded during the last decade (see Campbell 
and Eden 2007), though not with the purpose to support the NIE but to proof 
the non-neutrality of money and, as a consequence, the effectiveness of an ac-
tive monetary policy. Rigid prices are of course changed once in a while. Tra-
ders don’t change prices all the time but may try to approach equilibrium pri-
ces by a weekly or monthly trial and error process. Thus, e.g., Campbell and 
                                                             
28  The illustration of the equilibrium price of a commodity by the intersection of an upwards 
sloping supply curve (“law of supply”) and a downward sloping demand curve (“law of 
demand”) in a system of coordinates whose vertical axis denotes the price and horizontal 
axis the quantity of the commodity. We are concerned here only with issues of the institu-
tional framework of markets. For that purpose suffice, for the time being at least, the classi-
cal plausibility considerations regarding the price dependence of the quantities of demand 
and supply. The microeconomic foundation of these relationships and of the existence of 
market equilibrium is object of neoclassical microeconomics. 
29  Not unlike to the Lange-Lerner model of market socialism (Hayek 1945).  
30  However, as Carlton (1986) has shown, the degree of price rigidity differs greatly across 
industries. In some industries the average price does not change for periods well over one 
year while in other industries the price changes quite frequently. 
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Eden (2007, 1) report, there is evidence that grocery stores “extensively expe-
riment” with their prices.31 However, there may exist also tacit price agree-
ments among competitors as explained by oligopoly theory, and suppliers may 
change their prices only according to the announcements of a one firm – the 
price leader (Stigler, 1952, 234).  
Representatives of the New Institutional Economics such as Armen A. Alchian 
(1987) argue that rigid prices are part of an – between sellers and buyers – 
implicitly agreed upon market order (market system). He describes the practice 
of posted prices as follows:  
Posted prices, announced publicly and maintained until publicly revised, are 
prices at which the posting party will transact any amount. All parties obtain 
the same price; the price to a particular party could not be changed while all 
others were getting better prices (127). 
The author gives as examples tuna and salmon fishing, “where the fishing boats 
are reliant on a unique buyer-processor. Similarly, a fixed price guarantee 
occurs in many agricultural product markets where farmers plant crops relying 
on a unique buyer-processor” (127). The reason is to create planning security.  
Another reason for price rigidity is that, in long-term business relationships 
that require relationship-specific investments, “opportunistic price changes 
(intended to effect a hold-up) are not clearly or cheaply distinguishable from 
price changes to which the parties would have agreed had the demand and 
supply environment been mutual foreseen” (Alchian and Woodward 1987, 
128). 
Whether prices change by split seconds or once a year – what matters is that 
the price mechanism steers demand and supply towards equilibrium – not non-
price controls such as queues or rationing cards and not take-it-or-leave-it 
offers of monopolists. It is here where the collective actions of anti-trust meas-
ures and their enforcement by the state enter the picture.32  
We now come to the problem of contractual stipulations, a central issue of 
principal agent or adverse selection theory. Both approaches deal with prob-
lems of asymmetric information but continue to use the neoclassical assump-
                                                             
31  Campbell and Eden (2007, 2) report that according to their study “Increasing the difference 
between an item’s price and the average price for the same item at other stores substantially 
raises the probability of a price change. However, the probability of changing a price close 
to average far exceeds zero, and most price changes occur with the original price close to 
average. In simple menu-cost models, extreme prices arise from the erosion of a fixed 
nominal price by other sellers’ adjustments. Therefore, they are older than average. We find 
that most extreme prices are relatively young (less than a month old). That is, grocers delib-
erately select extreme prices, which they then quickly abandon. Taken together these results 
suggest to us that sellers extensively experiment with their prices.” (Emphasis added). 
32  To work properly, price competition requires an economic constitution (“order”) whose 
formation cannot be left to laissez-faire. Rather, design and administration of the economic 
constitution is the task of economic policy or “Ordnungspolitik” by the state (Eucken 
(1950, 314). 
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tions of perfect rationality, perfect foresight (apart from some “asymmetric” 
blind spot) and zero transaction costs. Mathematically their approach is based 
on an ingenious form of constrained optimazation with pretty far-reaching 
assumptions on the constraints. Thus, in case of the principal-agent approach, 
the principal is admittedly unable to observe what effort level his agent is sup-
plying. But he knows perfectly well his agent’s preferences and his reservation 
utility or the properties of the stochastic influences of nature on the result. 
Contracts are complete in the sense that, once concluded, they are (and can be) 
executed as agreed upon. It is here where Williamson’s critique enters by em-
phasizing the problems that may arise after contract conclusion. They can be 
particularly bothersome if transaction specific investments play a role, which 
would require very detailed agreements before contract conclusion. However, 
under (Knightian) uncertainty it is impossible to write a complete contract that 
details all possible future contingencies,33 wherefore contracts are unavoidably 
incomplete. They contain loopholes and the lock-in of the parties (resulting 
from their transaction specific investments) may invite opportunistic behavior 
of the other side. Due to information costs (a special kind of transaction costs), 
the parties may be unable to verify their case to a court. Thus, governance by 
court ordering may have to be supplemented or even substituted by that of 
private ordering to effectively protect the parties against opportunism of their 
trade partners.34 As one can realize, Williamson’s theory of contractual stipula-
tions (his “transaction cost theory”) stretches to the Postcontractual activities 
we reserved for the next section. 
Williamson (1985), for one, drew economists’ attention to the American le-
gal literature, in particular Macneil’s concept of relational contract. It is based 
on long term arrangements in which past, present, and expected future personal 
relations among the contractual parties matter (Macneil 1974, 753). Therefore, 
such contracts are, to a degree, implicit, informal, and nonbinding. Self-
enforcement (private ordering) becomes an important supplement of court 
ordering. Transactions are normally part of ongoing and long-term business 
associations. As such, they play an important role in modern economic life.  
Often contracts are necessarily and intentionally incomplete because of mutual 
desires for flexible but bounded responses to uncertain future conditions that 
limit the scope and precision of verifiable terms. Moreover, incomplete 
contracts often exist deeply embedded in an ongoing relationship. The parties 
                                                             
33  For lack of knowledge of what the future will bring, i.e., of all the stochastic variables.  
34  Mathematical economists such as Grossman and Hart (1986) have criticised the imprecision 
of TCE. They tried to develop, instead, a formal version of transaction cost economics. But 
their theory of incomplete contracts, as it became known, does not really deal with the cen-
tral problem of TCE: ex post opportunism. Grossman and Hart explain rationally only who 
should acquire a (private) property right, in their case who should become the owner of the 
residual decision right of a contractual relation between a supplying and a buying firm (Hart 
1995, 5ff.). 
 46
are not strangers; much of their interaction takes place “off the contract,” 
mediated not by visible terms enforceable by a court, but by a particular ba-
lance of cooperation and coercion, communication and strategy. (Hadfield 
1990, 927) 
Sociology aside, social relations play an important role in both the legal and the 
economic side of the organization of markets. That is, contractual relations 
(Macneil 1978) develop between suppliers and their customers: Customer 
relationships matter. Given the specific investments on both sides, and the 
resulting lock-in effect, coordination by advertisements or research and devel-
opment (qualitative competition) has much better properties than price adjust-
ments. As Williamson (1985, 76) argues, “price adjustment proposals involve 
the risk that one’s opposite is contriving to alter the terms within the bilateral 
monopoly trading gap to his advantage.”  
As for financial markets, securitized money loan contracts are as classical as 
contracts can be – with market prices being proverbially flexible. However, it 
would be wrong to conclude from this that financial markets are perfect. In the 
contrary, they are incomplete markets – in the sense of Arrow’s time-state 
preference markets – due to transaction costs, imperfect foresight and bounded 
individual rationality. As a result, “[…] not all risks which it would be desir-
able to shift can be shifted through the market.”35 The incompleteness of finan-
cial markets can be allowed for by suitable arrangements of debt contracts or 
by non-market constructs (collective actions) such as licensing, private or pub-
lic regulation, limited liability, bankruptcy – or “large business organizations” 
(Arrow 1970, 141). The latter is in effect a repeat of Coase’s (1936) explana-
tion of the nature of the (financial) firm “by other means,” viz., for reasons of 
incomplete foresight: Financial firms offer, i.e., an organizational answer (“hi-
erarchy”) to the trials and tribulations caused by transaction costs, imperfect 
foresight and bounded rationality, a governance structure of a collectivity of 
actors that allows them to react to unforeseen events by non-market methods. 
They can be seen as of privately controlled forms of collective actions.  
5. Postcontractual Activities:  
Execution, Control and Enforcement 
Under conditions of the NIE, the activities “execution and control” of contrac-
tual obligations require a communication mechanism that provides the informa-
tion necessary to know when “enforcement” is required (cf. North 1990, 57). 
“Enforcement” of contractual obligations may either be seen as an activity of a 
                                                             
35  Arrow (1970, 139); he puts the problem as follows: “What we observe is that the failure of 
the price system to handle risk-bearing adequately leads to a diminished use of prices even 
in contexts where they would be most useful in bringing about a careful and flexible con-
frontation of needs and resources” (1970, 141). 
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higher authority of an organization or state (an agreed upon mediator, a corpo-
rate board, a court) or as a form of self-enforcement in the sense of game the-
ory. In the first case the activity enforcement is a collective good of whose 
provision the community benefits but whose costs are born only by a small set 
of individuals. Olson’s free rider problem may arise. A ‘visible hand mecha-
nism,’ i.e., an organization is required to finance and carry out the activity 
“enforcement” when necessary. In the second case we are dealing with an 
‘invisible hand mechanism’ as described by the “institutions-as-an-equilibrium-
of-a-game” approach,36 that leads on to a Nash equilibrium, i.e., a state in 
which no actor has an incentive to deviate from his present plan of action as 
long as other actors do not do so.  
The institutions-as-an-equilibrium-of-a-game approach assumes that the 
misbehavior of players is public information. However, under conditions of the 
NIE, real world players are incompletely informed. Anyway, though transac-
tion costs play no [essential] role in game theory, game theoretic explanations 
of self-enforcement mechanisms are applied to answer real world situations 
characterized by costly information. Such models are therefore assumed to 
contain special private or small-scale public institutions that provide low cost 
information about each player’s behavioral history and coordinate community 
responses. The development of such institutions is the object of divers historic 
studies by scholars such as Milgrom, North and Weingast (1989), Greif (1989, 
1993, 2006) and Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994). However, from a certain 
point on transaction costs of such private (or small public) systems of third 
party enforcement would become prohibitive (North 1990, 58) and will result 
finally in the establishment of a territorial state – in spite of the problems of its 
control. We’ll relate in this paper briefly only on three articles – two historic 
contributions by Greif (1993) and, Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994) plus 
one on modern times by Baron (2002).  
The two historic papers describe an early and a more intermediate stage on 
the road from personal to impersonal exchange – both characterized by the 
separation between the quid and the quo over time and space. The third paper 
on modern times describes one of today’s most successful dot-com ventures: 
the reputation mechanism of eBay’s online market. 
The paper by Greif (1993) deals with the problem of trust between a mer-
chant and his travelling agent using the example of the organization of a coali-
tion of Jewish traders, the Maghribi, who pursued complex, long-distance trade 
in the Mediterranean during the eleventh century. The Maghribi had organized 
an informal principal-agent relationship – with the traders being the principals 
and their employed “overseas agents” being the agents. The latter accompanied 
                                                             
36  According to which an institution is defined as a salient Nash equilibrium of a recurrent 
“supergame” about the way a given “underlying game” (e.g., a prisoner’s dilemma game) is 
repeatedly played (see Furubotn and Richter 2005, 8). 
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the sea transport of the goods, searched for buyers, negotiated and concluded 
purchasing contracts, monitored the transfer of the goods, and secured pay-
ments. Complete contingent contracts between principals and agents were 
impossible because of lack of foresight. Also impossible was a direct monitor-
ing of the agents by the principals. Similarly, court ordering against fraudulent 
agents was not feasible. Despite these difficult conditions, the Maghribi mer-
chants were still able to help themselves by establishing the following agree-
ment. The agents were, or became, members of an economic institution, the 
group of traders of the Maghribi. They earned premiums for good behavior. 
But, if any agent deceived his principal just once, he got no more assignments 
for the rest of his life from the merchants of the Maghribi group. If a fraudulent 
agent tried to become a principal (a merchant) himself, his Maghribi agent was 
free to deceive him. No Maghribi tradesmen or merchants would punish him in 
the usual manner. Thus, he would soon be driven out of business. Insofar, “[…] 
the Maghribi traders established a relationship between past conduct and future 
economic rewards. As a result, agents resisted the short-term gains attainable 
through deception […]” (Greif 1989, 881).  
The paper by Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994) interprets merchant 
guilds in the light of a repeated-game model to conclude that guilds (a public 
organization) emerged to allow rulers of trading centers to credibly commit 
themselves to the security of the person and property of alien merchants. They 
centralized information about rulers’ behavior and disputes among merchants, 
and were able to apply sanctions against breach of promises by rulers (city 
governments) that required effective collective actions. In effect, guilds pro-
vided merchants with the leadership and the information transmission mechan-
ism required for coordinated action. They decided when to impose a trade 
embargo and when to cancel it (p. 755). Members could also obtain informa-
tion from guilds about disputes between their members or other traders. Model-
ling city – trader relationships as equilibria of repeated games is impossible 
because of the asymmetry of power (size) between city and foreign traders. 
Also the interposition of a merchant guild, which organizes communication and 
coordination between traders, does not necessarily lead to reputation equilibria 
because individual traders have no incentive to participate in the boycott of a 
city. To be effective, merchant guilds (like labor unions) have to be strong 
enough to force members to do so rather than to serve their individual interest 
(771). The authors do not deny that merchant guilds were cartels but maintain 
that they originally served as countervailing powers against rulers of trading 
centers (cities) and thus facilitated trade expansion. In the course of time, when 
larger political units emerged and took over the functions of merchant guilds, 
merchant guilds did not necessarily disappear but were transformed into mono-
polistic organizations that may have hindered the expansion of trade (773). The 
institution of the merchant guild was so to speak complemented by the institu-
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tion of the “community responsibility system” as described by Greif (2006). It 
was a further step into the direction of modern impersonal exchange. 
One of the most extreme cases of modern impersonal exchange represents 
the online auction market organized by eBay. Baron (2002) gives a detailed 
description of it. Traders are anonymous and remote; buyers cannot examine 
the items before bidding and have to pay in advance for items they had not 
inspected. Sellers have little recourse if a winning bidder refuses to pay (Baron 
2002, 254). Still, trade flourishes and eBay became one of the true dot-com 
successes. Its achievement is based on trust among members of the “eBay 
community of traders,” which represents eBay’s principal asset; “eBay’s stra-
tegic focus is to support and expand this community.” For that purpose eBay 
established and attends to a multilateral online reputation mechanism based on 
[published] feedback provided by the transacting parties (246). This mecha-
nism generated incentives similar to those in a long-term personal relationship 
between buyer and seller. Of course, a community based on trust was vulner-
able to (outright) fraud. But fraud remained rare and can be covered by an 
insurance against fraud (272). Baron concludes:  
The internet allowed an online reputation mechanism to support trust among 
anonymous traders, most of whom would not have repeated bilateral ex-
change. The reputation mechanism was multilateral and based on feedback 
provided by the parties to a transaction. This mechanism was the heart of 
eBay’s strategy of building a community and sharing in the value created for 
its members. (Baron 2002, 272) 
So much on our three examples; for a systematic review of economic historic 
papers on private ordering that are largely based on the problem of prisoner-
dilemma games see McMillan and Woodruff (2000). They emphasize two 
ways to counter the self-defeating incentives of PD-games: The law and re-
peated PD games with the possible threat of retaliation. “If the legal system 
functioned perfectly, contracts would never need to be self-enforcing. The 
advantage of private ordering is that the market participants are mostly better 
informed than judges.” Important as private ordering may be – in a modern 
society it could not replace public ordering.  
6. Final Remarks 
As we have seen, the market is not just “supply and demand determines the 
price”. To function properly, it demands a set of rules that regulate not only the 
price mechanism, but also the other basic functions of trade like search, inspec-
tion, contract execution, control, and enforcement. Independent of whether 
these rules evolved spontaneously or were made by identifiable people, they 
must be well designed and well implemented. As the sub prime mortgage crisis 
of 2008 illustrates: the quality and execution of these trading rules is vital for 
the functioning of the market itself, which is by no means a marginal problem.  
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To be sure, there exists no comprehensive NIE theory of “the market itself”. 
But there are a number of empirical studies on the basic functions of trade: 
search, inspection, bargaining, contract execution, control, and enforcement. 
Most of them read like illustrations of an invisible hand mechanism. But there 
are also a few reports on clear cases of visible hand interventions of which the 
following were briefly mentioned:  
- Public or private quality control of financial assets to avoid the brake 
down of financial markets as a consequence of Akerlof’s lemons 
principle as illustrated by Hellwig (2008), 
- Public anti-trust measures to secure the functioning of the price 
mechanism as emphasized by Eucken (1950), 
- Public or private organization of execution, control and enforcement as 
described by North (1990). 
- Bankruptcy as a means to secure an orderly liquidation of debtors in fi-
nancial distress or to help the rehabilitation and continuation of their bu-
siness – for reason of the “failure of the price system to handle risk-
bearing adequately” (Arrow 1970, 141). 
We wish to mention that the institutional details of the basic activities of trade 
are also subject matter of legal regulations such as of property right law and 
contract law.37 
We conclude by repeating that the market is a privately or publicly supplied 
collective good and that the assumption, sophisticated market participants will 
seek to protect themselves by purely relying on invisible hand mechanisms is 
contra-factual.38 For reasons of general public interest some visible hand 
mechanism – products of collective actions – seem unavoidable, such as anti-
trust measures (Eucken 1950) and regulations of financial markets.39  
References 
Abolafia, M. Y. 1984. Structural Anarchy: Formal Organization in the Commodity 
Futures Markets. In Adler and Adler: 129-149. 
Akerlof, G. A. 1970. The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84: 488-500. 
Alchian, A. A. 1950. Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory. Journal of 
Political Economy 58: 211-21. 
Alchian, A.A., and S. Woodward. 1987. Reflections on the Theory of the Firm. 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 143: 110-137. 
Aoki, M. 2001. Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis. Cambridge, MA.  
Arrow, K. J. 1970. Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. Amsterdam: North-
Holland. 
                                                             
37  Examples see e.g. Furubotn and Richter (2005, ch. 3 and 4). 
38  Quinn (2009, 6).  
39  For fear of systemic risks; see, e.g., Kroszner and Strahan (1999).  
 51
Arrow, K. J. 1974. The Limits of Organization. New York & London: Norton. 
Barharad, E., and B. Eden. 2004. Price Rigidity and Price Diversion: Evidence from 
Micro Data. Review of Economic Dynamics 7: 613-641. 
Baron, D. P. 2002. Private Ordering on the Internet: The eBay Community of Trad-
ers. Business and Politics 4: 245-274.  
Barzel, Y. 1982. Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets. Journal of 
Law and Economics 25: 27-48. 
Blinder, A. S., E. R. D. Canetti, D. E. Lebow, and J. B. Rudd. 1998. Asking About 
Prices. A new Approach to Understanding Price Stickiness. New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation. 
Burt, R. S. 1983. Corporate Profits and Cooptation: Networks of Market Con-
straints and Directorate Ties in the American Economy. New York: Academic 
Press. 
Campbell, J. R., and B. Eden. 2005. Rigid Prices: Evidence from U.S. Scanner 
Data, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working Paper Series. <http://www.org/ 
publications/workingpapers/wp2005_08.pdf>. 
Carlton, D. W. 1986. The Rigidity of Prices. American Economic Review 76: 637-
58. 
Coase, R. H. 1974. The Lighthouse in Economics. Journal of Law and Economics 
17: 357-376. 
Coase, R. H. 1988. The Firm, the Market, and the Law. Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Coleman, J. S. 1984. Introducing Social Structure into Economic Analysis. Ameri-
can Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 74: 84-88. 
Demsetz, H. 1969. Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint. Journal of Law 
and Economics 12: 1-22. 
Dimand, R. W. 2008. Monetary economics, history of. In The New Palgrave Dic-
tionary of Economics, 2nd ed., ed. St. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume. Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Egbert, H. 2007. The Culture of a Market: A Case of Open-air Horse Markets. 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 163: 493-502. 
Eucken, W. 1950. The Foundations of Economics. History and Theory in the Analy-
sis of Economic Analysis, Translated by T. W. Hutchison, London et al. William 
Hodge. 
Eucken, W. 1975. Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik, 5. ed., [1st ed.1952] Tübin-
gen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).  
Friedman, M. 1953. Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago. 
Furubotn, E. G., and R. Richter. 2005. Institutions and Economic Theory. The 
Contribution of the New Institutional Economics, 2nd revised and extended edi-
tion, [1st ed. 1997]. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Furubotn, E. G., and R. Richter, eds. 2010. The New Institutional Economics of 
Markets. Cheltenham, UK: Elgar.  
Granovetter, M. 1995. Getting A Job. A Study of Contacts and Careers, 2nd ed. [1st. 
ed. 1974] Chicago.  
Greif A. 2005. Institutions, Markets, and Games. In The Economic Sociology of 
Capitalism, ed. V. Nee and R. Swedberg. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Greif, A. 1989. Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the 
Maghribi Traders. Journal of Economic History 49: 857-882.  
 52
Greif, A. 1993. Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: 
The Maghribi Tranders’ Coalition. American Economic Review 83: 525-548. 
Greif, A. 1998. Self-Enforcing Political Systems and Economic Growth: Late Me-
dieval Genoa. In Analytic Narratives, ed. R.H. Bates, A. Greif et. al., 23-63. Prin-
ceton: Princeton University Press. 
Greif, A. 2006. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from 
Medieval Trade (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Greif, A., P. Milgrom, and B. R. Weingast. 1994. Coordination, Commitment, and 
Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild. Journal of Political Economy 
102: 745-776. 
Grossman, S. J., and O. D. Hart. 1986. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A 
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy 94: 691-
719. 
Hadfield, G. K. 1990. Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incom-
plete Contracts. Stanford Law Review 42: 927-92. 
Hamilton, G. G., and R. C. Feenstra. 1995. Varieties of Hierarchies and Markets: 
An Introduction. Industrial and Corporate Change 4: 51-91. 
Hart, O., and B. R. Holmström. 1987. The Theory of Contracts. In Advances in 
Economic Theory, ed. T. Bewley, 77-155. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Hart, O. D. 1995. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure. Oxford: Clarendon. 
Hayek, F. A. 1945. The Use of Knowledge in Society. American Economic Review 
35: 519-530. 
Hayek, F. A. 1948. Individualism and Economic Order. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Hayek, F. A. 1967. Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press. 
Hayek, F. A. 1973. Law, Legislation, and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal 
Principles of Justice and Economy, vol. 1, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Hellwig, M. 2008. Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Sub-
prime-Mortgage Financial Crisis. Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Re-
search on Collective Goods, Bonn 2008/43. Electronic copy: <http://www. 
univie.ac.at/vwl/TheoretischerAusschuss/Papers/2009/Hellwig_Subprime-
MortgageFinancialCris.pdf>. 
Hicks, J. R. 1946. Value and Capital. An Inquiry into some Fundamental Principles 
of Economic Theory, 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon. 
Hume, D. 1969. A Treatise of Human Nature, [1st ed. 1739-1740] ed. E. C. Moss-
ner. London: Penguin. 
Karazman-Morawetz, I., and A. Pilgram. 1993. Ostgrenzöffnung als Gelegenheit: 
irreguläres Erwerbshandeln und seine Kontrolle. In Grenzöffnung, Migration und 
Kriminalität. Jahrbuch für Rechts- und Kriminalsoziologie 1993, ed. A. Pilgram, 
147-168. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Kenney, R. W., and B. Klein 1983. The Economics of Block Booking. Journal of 
Law and Economics 26, 497-540. 
Kroszner, R. S., and P. E. Strahan. 1999. What Drives Deregulation? Economics 
and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions. Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 114: 1437-1467. 
 53
Lancaster, K. 1969. Introduction to Modern Microeconomics. Chicago: Rand 
McNally. 
Levy, D., M. Bergen, S. Dutta, and R. Venable. 1997. The Magnitude of Menu 
Costs: Direct Evidence from Large U.S. Supermarket Chains. Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 112: 791-825. 
Macneil, I. R. 1974. The Many Futures of Contracts. Southern California Law 
Review 47: 691-816. 
Macneil, I. R. 1978. Contracts: Adjustment of Long-term Economic Relations 
Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law. Northwestern Uni-
versity Law Review 72: 854-905. 
McMillan, J., and C. Woodruff. 2001. Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public 
Order. Michigan Law Review 98: 2421-2458.  
Menger, C. 1883. Untersuchungen über die Methode der Socialwissenschaften und 
der Politischen Oekonomie insbesondere. Leipzig. 
Milgrom, P. R., D. C. North, and B. R. Weingast. 1990. The Role of Institutions in 
the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne 
Fairs. Economics & Politics 2: 1-23. 
North, D. C. 1990. A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics. Journal of Theoretical 
Politics 2: 355-367. 
Olson, M. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Quinn, B. J. M 2009. The Failure of Private Ordering and the Financial Crisis of 
2008. NYU Journal of Law & Business 5 (2): 549-615. 
Richter, R. 2007. The Market as Organization. Journal of Institutional and Theoret-
ical Economics 163: 483-492. 
Richter, R. 2010. Entrepreneurs as Surrogate Forward Traders of Goods and Ser-
vices, Seen from the Viewpoint of New Institutional Economics. European Busi-
ness Organization Law Review (EBOR) 11: 459-475. 
Richter, R. 2011. German “Ordnungstheorie” from the Perspective of the New 
Institutional Economics. Manuscript, Universität des Saarlandes, Rechts- und 
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Saarbrücken, Germany.  
Schelling, T. C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Schmidtchen, D. 1984. German ‘Ordnungspolitik’ as Institutional Choice. Zeit-
schrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft / Journal of Institutional and Theo-
retical Economics 140: 54-70. 
Sik, E., and C. Wallace. 1999. The Development of Open-air Markets in East-
Central Europe. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. 
Smith, V. 1962. An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior. Journal 
of Political Economy 70: 111-137.  
Spence, A. M. 1974. Market Signaling: Information Transfer in Hiring and Related 
Screening Processes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Spence, A. M. 1976. Informational Aspects of Market Structure: An Introduction. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 90: 591-97. 
Stackelberg, H. von 1948. Grundlagen der theoretischen Volkswirtschaftslehre, 
Bern: A. Francke Verlag. 
Stigler, G. J. 1968. Art. “Competition” In International Encyclopedia of Social 
Sciences 3: 181-182. New York: Macmillan.  
 54
Stigler, G. J. 1952. The Theory of Price, rev. ed. New York: Macmillan Co. 
Stigler, G. J. 1961. The Economics of Information. Journal of Political Economy 
69: 213-225. 
Stützel, W. 1959. Liquidität. In Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften, vol. 6, 
ed. E. v. Beckerath et.al., 622-629. Stuttgart. 
Telser, L. G. 1980. A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements. Journal of Business 
53: 27-44. 
Thünen, J. H. von 1826. Der Isolierte Staat in Beziehung auf Landwirthschaft und 
Nationalökonomie, oder Untersuchungen über den Einfluß, den die Getreideprei-
se, der Reichthum des Bodens und die Abgaben auf den Ackerbau ausüben. 
Hamburg: Pertes. 
Weingast, B. R. 1995. The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market Preserv-
ing Federalism and Economic Development. Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization 11: 1-31. 
Weingast, B. R. 1993. Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foun-
dations of Secure Markets. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 
149: 286-311. 
Williamson, O. E. 1983. Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Ex-
change. American Economic Review 73: 519-540. 
Williamson, O. E. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York et al.: 
Free Press. 
Williamson, O. E. 1996. The Mechanism of Governance. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.  
